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GLOSSARY 
Type of an agent. All the information possessed by this agent. It may refer to 
the preferences of this agent and/or to the knowlege of this agent of the preferences 
of other agents, 
State of the World. Description of all information possessed by all agents. 
Social Choice Rule. A correspondence mapping the set of states of the world 
in the set of allocations. It represents the social objectives that the society or its 
representatives want to achieve. 
Mechanism. A list of message spaces and an outcome function mapping 
messages into allocations. It represents the communication and decision aspects of 
the organization. 
                                                           
* I am grateful to Pablo Amorós, Claude d´Aspremont, Carmen Beviá, Luis Cabral, 
Eric Maskin, Carlos Pimienta, Socorro Puy, Tömas Sjöstrom, William Thomson, Matteo 
Triossi, Galina Zudenkova and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions and to the 
Spanish Ministery of Education for financial support under grant SEJ2005-06167. I also 
thank the Department of Economics, Stern School of Business, NYU, for their hospitality 
while writing this survey. This survey is dedicated to Leo Hurwicz to cellebrate his 90th 
birthday and his Nobel Prize and to the memory of those who contributed to the area and 
are no longer with us: Louis-André Gerard-Varet, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Richard McKelvey 
and Murat Sertel. 
 Equilibrium Concept. A mapping (or a collection of them) from the set of 
states of the world into allocations yielded by equilibrium messages. This 
equilibrium is a game-theoretical notion of how agents behave, e.g. Nash 
Equilibrium, Bayesian Equilibrium, Dominant Strategies, etc. 
Implementable Social Choice Rule in an Equilibrium Concept (e.g. Nash 
Equilibrium). A Social Choice Rule is implementable in an equilibrium concept 
(e. g. Nash Equilibrium) if there is a mechanism such that for each state of the 
world the allocations prescribed by the Social Choice Rule and those yielded by the 
equilibrium concept coincide. 
DEFINITION 
Implementation theory studies which social objectives (i.e. Social Choice 
Rules) are compatible with the incentives of the agents (i.e. are implementable). In 
other words it is the systematic study of the social goals that can be achived when 
agents behave strategically. 
1 Introduction
Dear colleague;
I wrote this survey with you in mind. You are an economist doing research
who would like to know why implementation is important. And by this I do not
mean why some people won the Nobel Prize working in this area. I mean, what
are the deep insights found by implementation theory and what applications are
delivered by these tools. I propose a simple game: try to answer the following
questions. If you cannot answer them, but you think they are important, read
the survey. At the end of this survey, I will give you the answers. I will also tell
you why I like implementation theory so much!
1. Why are agents price-takers? Is price-taking possible in economies with a
nite number of agents?
2. Suppose two rms wish to merge. They claim that the merger will bring
large cost reductions but some people fear that the rms just want to
avoid competition. What would be your advice?
3. How should a monopoly be regulated when regulators do not know the
cost function or the demand function of the monopolist?
4. How should it be determined whether or not a public facility -a road, a
bridge, a stadium- should be constructed and who should pay for it?
5. Is justice possible in this world? Can we reconcile justice and self-interest?
6. Can an uninformed planner achieve better allocations than those produced
by completely-informed agents in an unregulated market?
7. In competitive ice skating, the highest and lowest marks awarded by judges
are discarded and the remaining are averaged. Do you think that this
procedure eliminates incentives to manipulate votes?
8. What kind of policies would you advocate to ght Global Warming?
The answers to these questions are found in Section 6. The rest of this
paper goes as follows. Section 2 is a historical introduction that can be skipped.
Section 3 explains the basic model. Section 4 explains the main results. Section
5 o¤ers some thoughts about the future direction of the topic.
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2 Brief History of Implementation Theory
From, at least Adam Smith on, we have assumed that agents are motivated by
self-interest. We also assumed that agents interact in a market economy where
prices match supply and demand. This tradition crystallized in the Arrow-
Debreu-McKenzie model of General equilibrium in the 1950s. But it was quickly
discovered that this model had important pitfalls other than focussing on a nar-
row class of economic systems: On the one hand, an extra agent was needed
to set prices, the auctioneer. On the other hand agents follow rules, i.e. to
take prices as given, which are not necessarily consistent with self-interest. An
identical question had arisen earlier when Taylor (1929) and Lange (1936-7),
following Barone (1908), proposed a market socialism, where socialist managers
maximize prots: Why would socialist managers choose output in the way pre-
scribed to them (or who will provide and preserve capital in a system where the
private property of such items is forbidden?)? Samuelson (1954) voiced identi-
cal concern about the Lindahl solution to allocate public goods: "It is in the
selsh interest of each person to give false signals". This concern gave rise later
on to the golden rule of incentives -as stated by Roger Myerson (1985): "An
organization must give its members the correct incentives to share information
and act appropriately". Earlier, it had aroused the interest of Leonid Hurwicz,
the father of Implementation theory, in economic systems other than the mar-
ket. In any case it was clear that an important ingredient was missing in the
theory of economic systems. This element was that not all information needed
for resource allocation was transmitted by prices: Some vital items have to be
transmitted by agents.
Several proposals arose to ll the gap: On the one hand, models of markets
under asymmetric information, Vickrey (1961), Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973)
and Rothchild and Stiglitz (1976). On the other hand models of public inter-
vention, like optimal taxation, Mirless (1971), and mechanisms for allocating
public goods, Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973), with the so-called Principal-
Agent models somewhere in the middle. The key word was "Truthful Revela-
tion" or "Incentive Compatibility": Truthful revelation of information must be
an equilibrium strategy, either a dominant strategy, as in Clarke and Groves,
or a Bayesian equilibrium as in Arrow (1977) and DAspremont and Gerard-
Varet (1979). A motivation for this procedure was provided by the "Revelation
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Principle", Gibbard (1973), Myerson (1979), Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin
(1979) and Harris and Townsend (1981): If a mechanism yields certain alloca-
tions in equilibrium, telling the truth about ones characteristics must be an
equilibrium as well (however, telling the truth may not be an equilibrium in
the original mechanism you might have to use an equivalent direct mechanism).
This result is of utmost importance and it will be thoroughly considered in Sec-
tion 3. However, it was somehow misread as "there is no loss of generality in
focussing on incentive compatibility". But what the revelation principle asserts
is that truthful revelation is one of the, possibly, many equilibria. It does not
say that truthful revelation is the only equilibrium. As we will see in some cases
it is a particularly unsatisfactory way of selecting equilibria.
The paper by Hurwicz (1959), popularized by Reiter (1977), presented a for-
mal structure for the study of economic mechanisms which has been followed by
all subsequent papers. Maskin (1999), whose rst version circulated in 1977, is
credited as the rst paper where the problem of multiple equilibria was addressed
as a part of the model and not as an afterthought, see the report of the Nobel
Prize Committee (2007). Maskin studied implementation in Nash equilibrium
(see Glossary). Later his results were generalized to Bayesian Equilibrium by
Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) and Palfrey and Srivastava (1987), (1989).
Finally, Moulin (1979) studied Dominance Solvability and Moore and Re-
pullo (1988) Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. The century closed with several
characterizations on what can be implemented in other equilibrium concepts:
Moore and Repullo (1990) in Nash Equilibrium, Palfrey and Srivastava (1991) in
Undominated Nash Equilibrium, Jackson (1991) in Bayesian Equilibrium, Dutta
and Sen (1991a) in Strong Equilibrium and Sjöström (1993) in Trembling Hand
Equilibria. With all these papers in mind, the basic aspects of implementation
theory are now well understood.
The interested reader may complement the previous account with the surveys
by Maskin and Sjöström (2002) and Serrano (2004) which cover the basic results
and by Baliga and Sjöström (2007) for new developments including experiments.
See also Maskin (1985), Moore (1992), Corchón (1996), Jackson (2001) and
Palfrey (2002). Several important applications of Implementation Theory are
not surveyed here: Auctions, see Krishna (2002), Contract theory, see La¤ont
and Martimort (2001), Matching, see Roth (forthcoming) and Moral Hazard see
Ma, Moore and Turnbull (1988).
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3 The Main Concepts
We divide this section into four subsections: The rst describes the environment,
the second deals with social objectives, the third revolves around the notion of
a mechanism and the last denes the equilibrium concepts that we will use here.
3.1 The Environment
Let I = f1; :::; ng be the set of agents. Let i be the type of i. This includes
all the information in the hands of i. Let i be agent is type set. The set
 Qni=1i is the set of states of the world. For each  2  we have a feasible
set A() and a preference prole R() = (R1(); :::; Rn()). Ri() is a complete,
reexive and transitive binary relation on A(). Ii() denotes the corresponding
indi¤erence relation. Set A  S2A(). Let a = (a1; a2; :::; an) 2 A be an
allocation, also written (ai; a i), where a i  (a1; a2; :::; ai 1; ai+1; :::; an).
The standard model of an exchange economy is a special case of this model:
 is an economy. Xi()  <k is the consumption set of i: wi() 2 intXi() are
the endowments in the hands of i. The preferences of i are dened on Xi().
The set of allocations A() is dened as
A() = fa j
nX
i=1
(aij+wij())  0; j = 1; 2; :::; k; (ai1; ai2; :::; aik) 2 Xi(); 8i 2 Ig:
A special case of an exchange economy is bilateral trading: Here there are
two agents, the seller and the buyer. The seller has a unit of an indivisible
good and both agents are endowed with an innitely divisible good ("money").
Preferences are representable by linear utility functions. The type of each agent,
also called her valuation, is the marginal rate of substitution between both
goods. Finally, the set of types is a closed interval of the real line.
Another example is the social choice model where the set of states of the
world is the Cartesian product of individual type sets,  =
Qn
i=1i. The set of
feasible allocations is constant. The preferences of each agent only depend on
her type, for all  2 , Ri() = Ri(i) all i 2 I.
The model of public goods is a hybrid of the social choice and the exchange
economy models. For a subset of goods, say 1; 2; :::; l, agents receive the same
bundle (these are the public goods). For goods l + 1; :::; k, agents can consume
possibly di¤erent bundles.
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3.2 Social objectives
Implementation begins by asking what allocations we want to achieve. In this
sense, implementation theory reverses the usual procedure, namely, x a mecha-
nism and see what the outcomes are. The theory is rather agnostic as to who is
behind we: It could be a democratic society, it could be a dictator, a benevolent
planner, etc. Formally, a correspondence F :   A such that F ()  A() for
all  2  will be called a Social Choice Rule (SCR). Under risk or uncertainty,
allocations are state-dependent (recall the concept of contingent commodities in
General Equilibrium). Thus an allocation is a single-valued function f : ! A.
The notion of a SCR is replaced by that of a Social Choice Set (SCS) dened
as a collection of functions mapping  into A. Examples of SCR are the Pareto
rule, which maps every state into the set of Pareto e¢ cient allocations for this
state, the Walrasian SCR which maps every economy in the set of allocations
that are a Walrasian Equilibrium for this economy, etc.
If states of the world were contractible, i.e. if they could be written in an
enforceable contract specifying the allocations in each state, SCR or SCS would
be directly achieved, assuming that those not complying could be punished
harshly. Unfortunately, states of the world are a description of preferences
and productive capabilities, being those di¢ cult to describe and therefore easy
to manipulate. Thus, we have to nd another method to reach the desired
allocations.
3.3 Mechanisms
If the information necessary to judge the desirability of allocations is in the
hands of agents, it seems that the only way of retrieving this information is by
asking them. But, of course, agents cannot be trusted to reveal truthfully their
information because they might lose by doing so. Thus the owner of a defective
car will think twice about revealing the true state of the car if the price of
defective cars is less than the price of reliable cars. But perhaps we may design
ways in which the messages sent by di¤erent agents are checked one against the
other. We may also design ways in which agents send information by indirect
means, say by raising ags, making gestures, and so on and so forth. This is
the idea behind the concept of a mechanism (also called a game form).
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Formally, a mechanism is a pair (M; g) where M  Qn1 Mi is the message
space and g : M ! A is the outcome function. Mi denotes agent is message
space with typical element mi. In some cases, i.e. when goods are indivisible,
the outcome function maps M into the set of lotteries on A, denoted by LA.
In this case the outcome function yields the probability of obtaining an object.
Let m = (m1; ::;mn) 2 M , be a list of messages, also written (mi;m i) where
m i is a list of all messages except those sent by i.
Another interpretation of a mechanism, more in tune with decentralized
systems, is that messages describe contracts among agents and the outcome
function is a legal system that converts contracts into allocations.
If feasible sets are state dependent we have a problem: Suppose that at
 we want to achieve allocation a 2 A(): So there must be a message, say
m such that g(m) = a. But what if there is another state, say 0 for which
a =2 A(0)? In this case g(m) =2 A(0). In other words, since mechanisms are not
state dependent they may yield unfeasible allocations. We will postpone the
discussion of this problem until Section 5. For the time being, let us assume
that feasible sets are not state dependent.
3.4 Equilibrium
Since the messages sent by agents are tied to their incentives, it is clear that
we have to use an equilibrium concept borrowed from game theory. Thus, given
 2 ; a mechanism (M; g) induces a game in normal form (M; g; ). There
are many "solutions" to what would constitute an equilibrium. Let us begin by
considering the notion of a Nash equilibrium
Denition 1: A message prole m 2M is a Nash equilibrium for (M; g; )
if, for all i 2 I g(m)Ri()g(mi;m i) for all mi 2Mi:
Let NE(M; g; ) be the set of allocations yielded by all Nash equilibria of
(M; g; ). We now ask, given a SCR, what mechanism, if any, would produce
outcomes identical to the SCR. In this sense, the mechanism is the variable of
our analysis i.e. the mechanism "solves" the equation NE(M; g; ) = F (), for
all  2 . Formally,
Denition 2: The SCR F is implementable in Nash equilibrium if there is
a mechanism (M; g) such that, for all  2 ; NE(M; g; ) 6= ; and:
1: F ()  NE(M; g; ).
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2: NE(M; g; )  F ().
The previous concept can be easily generalized. Given a mechanism (M; g)
an equilibrium concept is a mapping, say E(M;g) :  A such that E(M;g)() 
A() for all  2 . For instance E(M;g)() may be the set of allocations arising
from dominant strategy proles in  when the mechanism (M; g) is in place. The
notion of implementation in an equilibrium concept easily follows. See Thomson
(1996) for a discussion of other concepts of implementation.
The problem is that some equilibrium concepts can not be written in the
way we just described because the actions to be taken in state, say 0, depend
on preferences in states other than 0. To see this, suppose that agents attach
a vector of probabilities to each possible type of the other agents, Harsanyi
(1967/68). Denote by q( i=i) the vector of probabilities attached by i that
other agents have types  i given that she is of type i. For simplicity assume
that it is a strictly positive vector. Suppose that preferences are representable
by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index Vi(a; ): In this framework, (as
rst noticed by Vickrey [1961]) a strategy for i, denoted by si, is no longer a
message but a function from the set of types of i in the set of messages of i,
namely, si : i ! Mi. A strategy prole, s, is a collection of strategies, one
for each agent, s = (s1; ::::; sn) also written as (si; s i). For simplicity, the next
denition assumes that type sets are nite.
Denition 3: A Bayesian Equilibrium (BE) for (M; g;R()) is a s such
that for all i,  2 , and mi 2Mi;X
 i2 i
q( i j i)Vi(g(s()); ) 
X
 i2 i
q( i j i)Vi(g(mi; s i( i)); )
Thus, an equilibrium concept -given a mechanism- is a collection of functions,
denoted by H(M;g), such that for all h(M;g) 2 H(M;g) h(M;g) :  ! A. Finally,
the denition of implementable SCS in BE follows.
Denition 4: The mechanism (M; g) implements a SCS F in BE if:
1: For any BE s there exists x 2 F (), such that g(s()) = x() for all  2 .
2: For any x 2 F , there is a BE s such that g(s()) = x() for all  2 .
Looking at our denitions of an implementable SCR or SCS we see that the
rst requirement is that all equilibria yield "good" allocations. The second re-
quirement is that given an allocation to be implemented, there is an equilibrium
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"sustaining" this allocation. These two requirements bear some resemblance to
the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics, namely that competitive
equilibrium is e¢ cient and that any e¢ cient allocation can be achieved as a
competitive equilibrium with the appropriate endowment redistribution. Notice
that endowment redistribution is not used in the denition of implementation.
4 The Main Insights
We group our results here under three headings: The Revelation Principle and
its consequences, Monotonicity and how to avoid it and the limits of design. We
will discuss them each in turn.
4.1 The Revelation Principle and its Consequences
The denition of a mechanism is extremely abstract. No conditions have been
imposed on what might constitute a message space or an outcome function.
And since implementation theory considers the mechanism the variable to be
found, this is an unhappy situation: we are asked to nd something whose
characteristics we do not know! Fortunately the revelation principle comes to
the rescue by stating a necessary condition for implementation: If a single valued
SCR, which we will call a Social Choice Function (SCF) is implementable, there
is a revelation mechanism for which telling the truth is an equilibrium. A
revelation mechanism (associated with a SCF) is a mechanism in which the
message space for each agent is her set of types and the outcome function is the
SCF. We say that a SCF is truthfully implementable or incentive compatible
if truth-telling is a Bayesian equilibrium (or a dominant strategy) of the direct
mechanism associated with it. The following result formally states the revelation
principle:
Theorem 1. If f is a Bayesian (resp. dominant strategy) implementable SCF,
f is incentive compatible.
Proof. Let f be Bayesian implementable. Therefore, there exists a mecha-
nism (M; g) and a Bayesian equilibrium s such that g(s()) = f() for every
 2 . Since s() is a Bayesian equilibrium, 8 2 ;8mi 2MX
 i2 i
q( i j i)Vi(g(s()); ) 
X
 i2 i
q( i j i)Vi(g(mi; s i( i)); ):
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Which implies that 80i 2 i;8 i 2  i;X
 i2 i
q( i j i)Vi(f(); ) 
X
 i2 i
q( i j i)Vi(f(0i;  i); ):
The proof for the case of dominant strategies is identical.
Theorem 1 (T.1 in the sequel) can be explained in terms of a mediator, i.e.
somebody to whom you say "who you are" and who chooses the strategy that
maximizes your payo¤s on your behalf. Would you try to fool such a person? If
you do so, you are fooling yourself because the mediator would choose a strategy
that is not the best for you. Thus, the best thing for you to do is to tell the
truth (providing an unexpected backing to the aphorism "honesty is the best
policy"!).
Consider now the following results, due to Hurwicz (1972) (who proved it for
the case of n = 2) and to Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) respectively.
Theorem 2. In exchange economies environments there is no SCF such that:
1) It is truthfully implementable in dominant strategies.
2) It selects individually rational allocations.
3) It selects e¢ cient allocations.
4) Its domain includes all economies with convex and continuous preferences.
Theorem 2. In social choice environments there is no SCF such that:
1) It is truthfully implementable in dominant strategies.
2) It is non-dictatorial.
3) Its range is A, with #A > 2.
4) Its domain includes all possible preference proles.
It is clear that there are trivial SCF in which any three conditions in T.
2-2 are compatible. But T.2-2 are very robust in the sense that they hold
for small domains of economies (Barberá and Peleg, 1990, Barberá, Sonnen-
schein and Zhou, 1991), for weaker notions of individual rationality (Saijo,
1991 and Serizawa and Weymark 2003) and in public goods domains (Ledyard
and Roberts, 1974). Moreover, assuming quasi-linear utility functions, Hurwicz
and Walker (1990), building on a previous paper by Walker, proved that the
set of economies for which conditions 1-3 in T.2 are incompatible is open and
dense. Beviá and Corchón (1995) show that these conditions are incompatible
for any economy where utility functions are quasi-linear, strictly concave, dif-
ferentiable and fulll a very mild regularity condition. These results show that
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Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms fail to achieve e¢ cient allocations in gen-
eral (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms are revelation mechanisms that work
in public good economies where utility functions are quasi-linear in "money".
The outcome function selects the level of public good that maximizes the sum of
utilities announced by agents and the money received by each individual is the
sum of the utility functions announced by all other agents. For an exposition of
these mechanisms, see Green and La¤ont, 1979).
A proof of T. 2 can be found in Serizawa (2002). Simple proofs of T. 2 can
be found in Barberá (1983), Benoit (2000) and Sen (2001).
T. 1 and 2-2imply that there is no mechanism implementing an e¢ cient and
individually rational (resp. non-dictatorial) SCF in dominant strategies when
the domain of the SCF is large enough. In other words, the revelation principle
implies that the restriction to mechanisms where agents announce their own
characteristic is not important when considering negative results. Thus, the
Revelation principle is an appropriate tool for producing negative results. But
we will see that to rely entirely on this principle when trying to implement a
SCF may yield disastrous results.
A natural question to ask is what happens with the above impossibility re-
sults when we weaken the requirement of implementation in dominant strategies
to that of implementation in Bayesian equilibrium. The following result, due to
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), answers this question.
Theorem 2. In the bilateral trading environment there is no SCF such that:
1) It is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Equilibrium.
2) It selects individually rational allocations once agents learn their types.
3) It selects ex-post e¢ cient allocations.
4) Its domain includes all linear utility functions with independent types dis-
tributed with positive density and the sets of types have a nonempty intersection.
Proof. (Sketch, see Krishna and Perry [1997] for details) By the revenue
equivalence theorem (see Klemperer, 1999, Appendix A), all mechanisms ful-
lling conditions 2) and 3) above raise identical revenue. So it is su¢ cient
to consider the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves which, as we remarked before, is not
e¢ cient.
Again the weakening of any condition in T.2may produce positive results
(Williams (1999), Table 1, presents an illuminating discussion of this issue). For
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instance, suppose seller valuations are 1 or 3, and buyer valuations are 0 or 2.
The mechanism xes the price at 1.5 and a sale occurs when the valuation of
the buyer is larger than the valuation of the seller. This mechanism implements
truthfully a SCF satisfying 2) and 3) above. Unfortunately, it does not work
when valuations are drawn from a common interval with positive densities.
But unlike T.2-2, there are robust examples of SCF truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Equilibrium when conditions 2) or 4) are relaxed. Also, ine¢ ciency
converges to zero very quickly when the number of agents increases (see Gresik
and Satterthwaite, 1989). This is because the equilibrium concept is now weaker
and we are approaching a land where incentive compatibility has no bite, as we
will see in T. 3 below.
First, dAspremont and Gerard-Varet (1975), (1979), and Arrow (1979)
showed that conditions 1)-3)-4) are compatible with individual rationality before
agents learn their types in the domain of public goods with quasi-linear utility
functions. They proposed the "expected externality mechanism" in which each
agent is charged the expected externality she creates on the remaining play-
ers. Later on, Myerson (1981) and Makowski and Mezzetti (1993) presented
incentive compatible SCF yielding ex-post e¢ cient and individually rational al-
locations in the domain of exchange economies with quasi-linear preferences and
more than two buyers. In Myerson (1981), agents have correlated valuations.
Buyers are charged even if they do not obtain the object or they may receive
money and no object or even receive the object plus some money. Makoswki and
Mezzetti (1993) assume no correlation and that the highest possible valuation
for a buyer is larger than the sellers highest possible valuation. They consider
a family of mechanisms, called Second Price Auction With Seller (SPAWS), in
which the highest bidder obtains the object, the seller receives the rst bid and
the winning buyer pays the second price. These mechanisms not only induce
truthful behavior and yield ex-post e¢ cient and individually rational alloca-
tions: For any other mechanism with these properties we can nd a SPAWS
mechanism yielding the same allocation.
Suppose now that information is Non-Exclusive in the sense that the type of
each player can be inferred from the knowledge of all the other playerstype. In-
tuition suggests that in this case, incentive compatibility has no bite whatsoever
(i.e. T2does not apply) since the behavior of each player can be "policed" by
the remaining players. In order to prove this, we will concentrate on an extreme,
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but illuminating, case of non-exclusive information, namely Nash equilibrium.
In this framework, since information is complete, a direct mechanism is one
where each agent announces a state of the world.
Consider the following assumption:
 (W) 9z 2 A such that 8 2 ;8a 2 A, aRi()z, 8i 2 I:
This assumption will be called "universally worst outcome" because it pos-
tulates the existence of an allocation which is unanimously deemed as the worst.
In an exchange economy this allocation would be zero consumption for every-
body. Now we have the following result (Repullo [1986], Matsushima [1988]):
Theorem 3. If n = 2 and W holds, any SCF is truthfully implementable
in Nash Equilibrium. If n > 2, any SCF is truthfully implementable in Nash
Equilibrium.
Proof. When n = 2 consider the following outcome function: g(0; 0) = f(0)
80 2 , g(0; 00) = z for all 0 6= 00. Clearly, truth is an equilibrium. When
n > 2, consider the following outcome function: If m is such that n  1 agents
announce state 0; then g(m) = f(0). Otherwise, g() is arbitrary. Clearly truth
is an equilibrium as well in this case :
The rst thing to notice is the di¤erence between the cases of two and more
than two individuals. We will have more to say about this in the next section.
The second is that the construction in Theorem 3 produces a large number
of equilibria, and that there seems to be no good reason for individuals to
coordinate in the truthful equilibria.
For instance, suppose workers can be either t or unt. When a prot-
maximizing rm asks its employees about their characteristics, and all workers
are t, a unanimous announcement such as "we are all unt" is an equilibrium.
If t workers are required hard work and unt workers are asked to light work,
do you think it is reasonable that workers coordinate in the truthful equilibrium?
A more elaborate example was produced by Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986):
There are three agents. The rst agent has no information and agents 2 and 3
are perfectly informed. The ranking of agent 1 over alternatives is the opposite
of agents 2 and 3 who share the same preferences. The SCF is the top alternative
of agent 1 in each state. It is intuitively clear that besides the truthful equilibria,
there is another untruthful equilibrium where both informed agents lie and they
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are strictly better o¤ than under truthful behavior. Again, coordination in the
truthful equilibrium seems very unlikely. Thus, we have to recognize that we
have a problem here. The next section will tell you how we can solve it.
Summing up, what do we learn from the results in this section?
1. When looking for an implementable SCF, a useful rst test is whether
this SCF yields incentives for the agents to tell the truth, see T.1. But
this test is incomplete because of the existence of equilibria other than the
truthful one, see T.3. These untruthful equilibria sometimes sound more
plausible than the truthful one.
2. All impossibility theorems -T. 2-2-2- have the same structure: Truthful
implementation, individual rationality/non-dictatorship, e¢ ciency/large
range of the SCR and large domain. Usually in social choice environments
conditions 2 and 3 are weaker than in economic environments but the
condition on the domain is stronger.
3. The classic story of the market making possible e¢ cient allocation of re-
sources under private information has to be revised. Private information
in many cases precludes the existence of any mechanism achieving e¢ cient
and individually rational allocations under informational decentralization,
see T. 2-2-2.
4. The same remarks apply to naive applications of the Coase theorem where
agents are supposed to achieve Pareto e¢ cient allocations just because
they have contractual freedom (ditto about Bargaining Theory). In the
parlance of Coase, private information is an important transaction cost.
5. When mechanisms with adequate properties exist, like those proposed
by Arrow, dAspremont and Gerard-Varet, Myerson and Makowski and
Mezzetti, they are not of the kind that we see in the streets. Careful
design is needed. These mechanisms are tailored to specic assumptions
on valuations, thus their range of applicability may be limited.
4.2 Monotonicity and how to avoid it
We have seen that equilibria other than the truthful one are likely to arise. We
have also seen that these equilibria cannot be disregarded a priori. So we have
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to nd a way of getting rid of equilibria that do not yield desirable allocations.
Under Dominant Strategies, clearly, if all preference orderings are strict, imple-
mentation and truthful implementation becomes identical, see Dasgupta, Ham-
mond and Maskin (1979), Corollary 4.1.4 (La¤ont and Maskin [1982] presents
other conditions under which this result holds. See Repullo (1985) for the case
where implementation and truthful implementation in dominant strategies do
not coincide). For the ease of exposition we consider next Nash equilibria.
It turns out that the key to this issue in the case of Nash Equilibrium is the
following monotonicity property, sometimes called Maskin monotonicity because
Maskin (1977) established its central relevance to implementation.
 (M) A SCR F is Monotonic if
fa 2 F (); aRi()b! aRi(0)b 8i 2 Ig ! a 2 F (0)
Monotonicity says that if an allocation is chosen in state  and this allocation
doesnt fall in anybodys ranking in state 0, this allocation must also be chosen
in 0. We will also speak of a "monotonic transformation of preferences at "
when the requirement aRi()b! aRi(0)b 8i 2 I is satised. This requirement
simply says that the set of preferred allocations shrinks when we go from  to
0.
Monotonicity looks like a not unreasonable property, even though as we will
see in a moment, there are cases in which it is incompatible with other very
desirable properties. In any case the importance of monotonicity comes from
the fact that it is a necessary condition for implementation in Nash Equilibrium,
as proved by Maskin (1977).
Theorem 4. If a SCR is implementable in Nash Equilibrium it is Monotonic.
Proof. If F is Nash implementable, there must be a mechanism (M; g) such
that 8a 2 F (), there is a Nash equilibrium m, such that g(m) = a. Since
aRi()b ! aRi(0)b 8i 2 I, m is also a Nash Equilibrium at 0. Since F is
implementable, a 2 F (0) :
Let us now discuss the concept of monotonicity. First, the bad news. Pop-
ular concepts in voting, like Plurality, Borda Scoring and Majority Rule are
not monotonic, neither is the Pareto correspondence, see Palfrey and Srivastava
(1991), p. 484. Even the venerable Walrasian correspondence is not monotonic!
The failure of the Pareto and the Walrasian SCR to be monotonic can be
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amended: If preferences are strictly increasing in all goods, the Pareto SCR
is monotonic in economic environments. The Constrained Walrasian SCR -
in which consumers maximize with respect to the budget constraint and the
availability of resources- is also monotonic. More serious is a result due to Hur-
wicz (1979) that uses two weak conditions on a SCR dened in the domain of
exchange economies.
 (L) The domain of F contains all preferences representable by linear utility
functions:
 (ND) If a 2 F () and aIi()b 8i 2 I, then b 2 F ():
The rst condition is a rather modest requirement on the richness of the
domain of F . The second is a non-discrimination property which says that if
everybody considers two allocations to be indi¤erent and one allocation belongs
to the SCR then it must be the other. Now we have the following:
Theorem 5. Let F be a SCR satisfying L and ND and such that:
1) It is Nash implementable.
2) It selects individually rational allocations.
Then, if x is a Walrasian allocation at , x 2 F ().
Proof. (Sketch, see Thomson (1985) for details) Take an economy . Let x
be a Walrasian allocation for . Consider a new economy, called L, where the
marginal rates of substitution among goods are constant and equal to a vector of
Walrasian prices. By individual rationality, F must select an allocation which is
indi¤erent to x. By ND, x 2 F (L): Since F is Nash implementable, it satises
M. Now since xRi(
L)b! xRi()b 8i 2 I, by M, x 2 F (). :
Thus under weak conditions, Walrasian allocation are always in the set of
those selected by a Monotonic SCR. And these allocations may fail to satisfy
properties of fairness or justice as pointed out by the critics of the market. Under
stronger assumptions, the converse is also true, i.e. only Walrasian allocations
can be selected by a Nash implementable SCR, Hurwicz (1979). Also, T. 5 has
the following unpleasant implication.
Theorem 6. There is no SCF in exchange economies such that:
1) It is Nash implementable.
2) It selects individually rational allocations.
3) ND holds.
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4) It is dened on all exchange economies.
Proof. T. 5 implies that any Walrasian allocation belongs to the allocations
selected by F . Since Walrasian equilibrium is not unique for some economies in
the domain, hence the result. :
T. 6 has a counterpart in social choice domains, Muller and Satterthwaite
(1977).
Theorem 6. There is no SCF in a social choice domain such that:
1) It is monotonic.
2) It is not dictatorial.
3) Its range is A with #A > 2.
4) It is dened on all possible preferences.
An implication of T. 6-6is that single valued SCR are still problematic. But
the consideration of multivalued SCR, brings a new problem: The existence
of several Nash equilibria. For instance, if a; b 2 F () with a and b being
e¢ cient allocations, agents play a kind of "Battle of the Sexes" game with no
clear results. Moreover the Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies may yield
allocations outside F () (the concern about mixed-strategy equilibria was rst
raised by Jackson [1992]).
Now let us come to the good news. Firstly, the ND condition, which is es-
sential for T. 5 to hold, is not as harmless as it appears to be. For instance,
it is not satised by the Envy-Free SCR, see Thomson (1987) for a discussion.
Secondly, there are perfectly reasonable SCR which are monotonic: we have
already encountered the Constrained Walrasian SCR. Also any SCR selecting
interior allocations in LA when preferences are von Neumann-Morgenstern is
monotonic. In the domain of exchange economies with strictly increasing prefer-
ences, the Core and the Envy-Free SCR are also monotonic. In domains where
indi¤erence curves only cross once -the single-crossing condition- monotonicity
vacuously holds. So Monotonicity, restrictive as it is, is worth a try. But before
this, let us introduce a new assumption
 (NVP) A SCR f satises No Veto Power if 8 2 ;
faRi()b; 8b 2 A; for at least n  1 agentsg ! a 2 F ()
In other words, if there is an allocation which is top-ranked by, at least, n 1
agents, NVP demands that this allocation belongs to the SCR. This sounds like
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a reasonable property for large n. Also in exchange economies with strictly
increasing preferences and more than two agents, NVP is vacuously satised
because there is no top allocation for n  1 agents.
The following positive result, a relief after so many negative results, was
stated and proved by Maskin (1977), although his proof was incomplete.
Theorem 7. If a SCR satises M and NVP is Nash implementable when
n > 2.
Proof. (Sketch) Consider the following mechanism. Mi =  A N where
N is the set of natural numbers. The outcome function has three parts.
Rule 1 (Unanimity). If m is such that all agents announce the same state of
the world, ; the same allocation a with a 2 F () and the same integer, then
g(m) = a.
Rule 2 (One Dissident). If there is only one agent whose message is di¤erent
from the rest, this agent can choose any allocation that leaves her worse o¤,
according to her preference as announced by others.
Rule 3 (Any other case). a 2 g(m) i¤ a was announced by the agent who
announced the highest integer (ties are broken by an arbitrary rule).
Let us show that such a mechanism implements any SCR with the required
conditions. Clearly if the true state is ~; mi = (~; a; 1) with a 2 F (~) is a Nash
Equilibrium since no agent can gain by saying otherwise, so Condition 1 in the
denition of Nash implementation holds. Let us now prove that Condition 2
there also holds. Suppose we have a Nash Equilibrium in Rule 1. Could it be
an "untruthful" equilibrium? If so we have two cases. Either the announced
preferences are a monotonic transformation of preferences at ~, in which case,
M implies that the announced allocation is also optimal at ~. If they are not,
there is an agent who can protably deviate. Clearly, if equilibrium occurs in
Rule 2, with, say, agent i as the dissident, any agent other than i can drive the
mechanism to Rule 3, so it must be that all these agents are obtaining their most
preferred allocation, which by NVP belongs to F (~). An equilibrium in Rule
3 implies that all agents are obtaining their most preferred allocation which,
again by NVP belongs to F (~). :
The interpretation of the mechanism given in the proof of T. 7 is that if
everybody agrees on the state and the allocation is what the planner wants,
this allocation is selected. If there is a dissident (a term due to Danilov [1992])
she can make her case by choosing an allocation (a "test allocation") in her lower
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contour set, as announced by others. Finally, with more than one dissident, its
the jungle! Any agent can obtain her most preferred allocation by the choice
of an integer. Typically, there is no equilibrium in this part of the mechanism.
Notice that (M) is just used to eliminate unwanted equilibria.
The mechanism is an "augmented" revelation mechanism (a term due to
Mookherjee and Reichelstein [1990]), where the announcement of the state is
complemented with the announcement of an allocation -this can be avoided if
the SCR is single valued- and an integer. The nal proof of T. 7 was done
independently by Williams (1986), Repullo (1987), Saijo (1988) and McKelvey
(1989).
The case of two agent is more complicated because when an agent deviates
from a common announcement and becomes a dissident, she converts the other
agent into another dissident! As in T. 3, W does the job, i.e. any SCR satisfying
M, NVP andW is Nash implementable, see Moore and Repullo (1990) and Dutta
and Sen (1991b) for a full characterization. Again, the cases of two agents and
more than two agents are di¤erent. In some areas of mathematics, such as
statistics and di¤erential equations the cases of two dimensions and more than
two dimensions are also di¤erent. The relationship of these with the ndings of
implementation is not yet fully explored, see Saari (1987).
Under asymmetric information M is substituted by a -rather ugly- Bayesian
Monotonicity (BM) condition which is a generalization of M to these environ-
ments. BM is again necessary and in conjunction with some technical conditions
plus incentive compatibility, su¢ cient for implementation in BE. The interested
reader can do no better than to read the account of these matters in Palfrey
(2002). It must be remarked that many well-known SCR -including Arrow-
Debreu contingent commodities and some e¢ cient SCR- do not satisfy BM and
thus cannot be implemented in BE. However, the Rational Expectations Equi-
libria and the (interim) Envy-Free SCR satisfy BM, see Palfrey and Srivastava
(1987).
T. 7 was the rst positive nding of implementation theory. And it prompted
researchers to be more ambitious: Can we implement without Monotonicity? An
interesting observation, due to Matsushima (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1991),
is that if agents have preferences representable by von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions, any SCR can be "virtually implemented" in the sense that
the set of allocations yielded by Nash equilibria is arbitrarily close to the set
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of desired allocations. This is because, as we saw before, any SCR mapping
in the interior of LA is Monotonic. Thus allocations in the boundary can be
arbitrarily approximated by allocations in the interior.
A more satisfying approach was introduced by Moore and Repullo (1988)
by introducing subgame perfection as the solution concept. It is not possible to
explain fully this approach here because it would take us too far; in particular
the notion of a mechanism must be generalized to "stage mechanism". Instead,
we give a result that conveys the force of subgame perfect implementation. It
refers to public good economies with quasi-linear utility functions -where under
dominant strategies the set of economies with ine¢ cient outcomes is large- and
with two individuals -where Nash implementability is harder to obtain.
Suppose that utility functions read Ui = V (y; i) +mi where y 2 Y  <,
i 2 i with #i < 1 and mi 2 <, i = 1; 2. The set of allocations A =
f(y;m1;m2) 2 Y <2=m1+m2  !g where ! are the endowments of "money".
Moore and Repullo (1988) proved the following:
Theorem 8. Any SCF is implementable in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in
the domain of economies explained above.
Moore and Repullo proved that many SCR which could not be implemented
in Nash Equilibrium can be implemented in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. This
is because subgames can be designed to kill unwanted equilibria without using
monotonicity. Their result was improved upon by Abreu and Sen (1991). The
problem with this approach is that the concept of subgame perfection is prob-
lematic because it requires that, no matter what has happened in past, in the
remaining subgame, players are rational, even if this subgame was attained
because some players made irrational choices.
The Moore-Repullo result was not only important by itself but it opened the
way to the consideration of other equilibrium concepts that allow very permissive
results. For instance, Palfrey and Srivastava (1991) proved the following result
Theorem 8. Any SCR satisfying NVP is implementable in Undominated
Nash Equilibrium.
At this point, it seemed that by invoking the adequate renement of Nash
equilibrium, any SCR could be implemented. But the implementing mechanisms
were getting weird and some people were beginning to get suspicious. Why and
how is discussed in the next section.
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Summing up the results obtained here, we have the following:
1. (Maskin) Monotonicity is a necessary and in many cases su¢ cient con-
dition for implementation in Nash Equilibrium, see T. 4 and 7. Similar
results are obtained with Bayesian Monotonicity in Bayesian Equilibrium.
2. The Monotonicity requirements are not harmless. Many solution concepts
do not satisfy it. Even worse, Monotonicity has some unpalatable conse-
quences, see T. 5-6.
3. Monotonicity can be avoided by considering stage games or renements of
Nash Equilibrium. Practically, any reasonable SCR can be implemented
in this way, see T. 8-8.
4.3 The Limits of Design
So far we have assumed that there are no limits to what the designer can do. She
can pick up any mechanism with no restrictions on its shape. This procedure,
indeed, pushes the possibilities of design to the limit. But by doing this, we
have learnt a good deal about the limitations of the theory of implementation.
It is fair to say that today the consensus is that there are some extra properties
which should be considered when designing an implementing mechanism. We
review here ve approaches to this question.
1: Game-Theoretical Concerns. Jackson (1992) was the rst to point
out that some mechanisms had unusual features from the point of view of game
theory: Some subgames have no Nash equilibrium. Message spaces, which in
the corresponding game become strategy spaces, are unbounded or open. Thus,
in the integer game considered in T. 7, if agents eliminate dominated strategies,
each integer is dominated by the next highest one and no integer is undominated:
Those agents who eliminate dominated strategies are unable to make a choice.
These constructions eliminate unwanted equilibria, which as we saw before, is
the problem with Nash implementation. Jackson illustrates his point by show-
ing that under no restrictions on mechanisms, any SCR can be implemented
in undominated strategies, a weak solution concept. Then he requires that
the mechanism be Bounded in the following sense: whenever a strategy mi is
dominated, there is another strategy dominating mi and which is undominated.
He shows that implementation in undominated strategies with bounded mecha-
nisms result many times in incentive compatibility, which as we saw in Section
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3 is a hard requirement. This shows the bite of the boundedness assumption.
However, in the case of implementation with undominated Nash equilibrium,
the boundedness assumption has little impact, see Jackson, Palfrey, and Srivas-
tava (1994) and Sjöström (1994). The rst of these papers introduced a related
requirement, the Best Response Property : for every strategy played by the other
agents, each agent has a best response.
2: Natural Mechanisms. Given that we have run so far from the kind
of mechanism we are used to, it seems reasonable to ask what can be imple-
mented by mechanisms that resemble real-life mechanisms. These mechanisms
must be simple too because simplicity is an important characteristic in practice.
Let us call them Natural Mechanisms. Dutta, Sen and Vohra (1995) consider
mechanisms in which messages are prices and quantities and thus resemble mar-
ket mechanisms. Their approach was rened by Saijo, Tatamitani and Yamato
(1996) who demanded the best response property as well. They showed that sev-
eral well-known SCR such as the (constrained) Walrasian, are implementable in
Nash equilibrium. Beviá, Corchón and Wilkie (2003) showed that in Bertrand-
like market games, the Walrasian SCR is implementable in Nash and Strong
equilibrium, showing that the fear of coalitions destabilizing market outcomes
is, at least, partially unwarranted. Sjöström (1996) considered quantity mecha-
nisms, reminiscent of those used by Soviet planners, with negative results about
what these mechanisms can achieve. In public good economies, Corchón and
Wilkie (1996) and Peleg (1996) introduced a market mechanism implementing
Lindahl allocations in Nash and Strong equilibrium. The mechanism works
because Lindahl prices have to add up to the marginal cost. If an agent pre-
tends to free ride she decreases the quantity of the public good. Here, contrary
to Samuelsons dictum it is in the selsh interest of each person to give true
signals. Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) o¤ered a bidding mechanism that
implements e¢ cient allocations when choosing between a nite number of public
projects. They also applied these ideas to back up Shapley value.
3: Credibility. Another implicit assumption is that once the mechanism is
in place, there is no way to stop it. Thus, if for some m, g(m) is a "universally
worst outcome", the planner has to deliver this allocation even if she is trying to
implement a Pareto E¢ cient allocation. Is this a credible procedure? In many
cases, if the planner is a real person it seems that she would do her best to avoid
g(m)! Here we have two possibilities: Either we identify additional constraints
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on the planner that look reasonable or we jump to model the planner as a full-
edged player. The rst road leads us to identify a subset of allocations of A, say
X, which can never be used by the mechanism. For instance, in Chakravorty,
Corchón and Wilkie (2006) X is the set of allocations that are never selected by
the SCR for some state of the world, i.e. X = fa 2 A=@ 2 ; a 2 F ()g. The
motivation for this denition is that it hardly seems credible that the planner can
choose an allocation that is never intended to be implemented. Redening the
allocation set asA  AnX the denitions of a mechanism and an implementable
SCR can be easily translated in this framework. However, depending on the
domain, SCR that are monotonic when dened on A are no longer monotonic
when dened on A: For instance, the (constrained) Walrasian SCR. Thus, these
SCR can not be implemented when the planner can only use allocations in A: A
weakness of this approach is that the list of reasonable constraints on allocations
may be large. The second possibility drives us to model implementation as a
signalling game where the planner receives signals -messages- from the agents,
updates her beliefs and then chooses an allocation which maximizes her expected
utility (Baliga, Corchón and Sjöström [1997]). Again, some SCR that are Nash
implementable, are not implementable in this framework. However, in this case
there are SCR that are not Nash implementable but are implementable in this
framework. This is because the model takes a basic assumption of game theory
to the limit, namely, that agents know the strategies of other players. In this
case, the planner knows if a report on agentstypes is truthful or not before the
allocation is delivered!
4: Renegotiation. Another strong assumption is that the mechanism pre-
scribes actions that can not be changed by agents. This contradicts experiences
such as black markets where agents trade on the existing goods (Hammond
[1987]). A way of modelling this is to assume that agents are able to rene-
gotiate some allocations (Maskin and Moore [1999]. Renegotiation in a dif-
ferent context was considered by Rubinstein and Wolinsky [1992]). Assuming
that agents have complete information, this is formalized by means of the con-
cept of a reversion function. This function, say r, maps each allocation and
each state of the world into a new allocation, i.e. r : A   ! A. The re-
version function induces new preferences, called reverted preferences (this is
the translation principle in Maskin and Moore [1999]). Notice that reverted
preferences are state dependent even if preferences are not. Formally, given
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a reversion function r, the reversion of R(), denoted by Rr() is dened as
aRri ()b , r(a; )Ri()r(b; );8a; b 2 A;8i 2 I: Given a reversion function r,
we can interpret that agentspreferences are the reverted preferences. Then,
all denitions given before can be adapted to this case. Again, SCR that were
monotonic there, are not so in this framework and viceversa. See Jackson and
Palfrey (2001) for applications. An extension to the case where there are several
renegotiation functions is given by Amoros (2004). A weakness of this approach
is that models renegotiation as a "black box".
5: Multiple Implementation. Maskin (1985) was the rst to realize
that the notion of implementation requires the planner to know the solution
concept used by the agents to analyze the game. He proposed the notion of
"Double Implementation" where a SCR was implemented at the same time in
Nash and Strong equilibria. He showed that many Nash implementable SCR
indeed are doubly implementable. We have seen in Point 2 above that the
(constrained) Walrasian and Lindahl SCR are doubly implementable by natural
mechanisms. They are also doubly implementable by abstract mechanisms,
Schmeidler (1980). Double implementation also occurs with several solutions
to the problem of the commons, Shin and Suh (1997) and Pigouvian Taxes,
Alcalde, Corchón and Moreno (1999). Yamato (1993) introduced another type of
double implementation by requiring implementation in Nash and Undominated
Nash Equilibria (1993). He showed that in a large class of exchange economies
with at least three agents, monotonicity is necessary and su¢ cient for double
implementation. Saijo, Sjöström and Yamato (2007) considered implementation
in Dominant Strategies and Nash Equilibrium. Clearly, other variations of the
idea of Double Implementation are possible, see Point 4 in Section 5 below.
Summing up, it is now clear that implementing mechanisms can not be just
"anything". Their features matter. Demanding that mechanisms satisfy the
best response property, be simple, not use extreme allocations, be robust to
the possibility of renegotiation and implement in several equilibrium concepts
makes our lives more di¢ cult but makes our models a great deal better.
5 Unsolved Issues and Further Research
1. Implementation with state dependent feasible sets. A motivation of
implementation theory was to study the possibility of socialism. However, all
25
the results presented in this survey refer to environments where the feasible set
is given, a far cry from any kind of planning procedure. In fact, there are only
a handful of papers dealing with implementation when the feasible set is un-
known: Postlewaite (1979) and Sertel and Sanver (1999) studied manipulation of
endowments. Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1995) studied implementation
assuming that endowments/production possibilities can be hidden or destroyed
but never exaggerated. Instead of a mechanism we have a collection of state
dependent mechanisms each meant for an economy. After the mechanism is
played, production capabilities are shown, e.g. endowments are put on the ta-
ble. This idea was worked out in a series of papers by Hong on private good
economies, Hong (1998), and by Tian on public good economies, Tian and Li
(1995). Serrano and Vohra (1997) worked out implementation of the core and
Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1999) of taxation methods. And thats all folks! Why
has such an important issue been almost neglected? My explanation is that the
proposed mechanisms are di¢ cult to understand. Another approach has been
tried by Corchón and Triossi (2005) where a reversion function takes care of
restoring feasibility when messages lead to unfeasible allocations. The approach
is tractable and simpler but relies on the black box of the renegotiation function.
2. Sociological factors/Bounded Rationality. So far, all the solution
concepts describing the behavior of agents are game-theoretical. In recent years,
we have seen a host of equilibrium concepts based on "irrational" agents. It
would be interesting to see what SCR can be implemented with these forms
of behavior. Eliaz (2002) considers "Fault Tolerant" implementation where a
subset of players ("faulty players") fail to achieve their optimal strategies. Under
complete information, No Veto Power and a strong form of Monotonicity are
su¢ cient for implementation when the number of faulty players is less than
n=2   1, n > 2. Matsushima (2008) shows that a small preference for honesty
is su¢ cient to knock down unwanted equilibria.
3. Dynamic Implementation. The theory presented here is static but
there are some papers dealing with implementation in dynamic set-ups. We
mention a few: Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985) studied the "Ratchet Ef-
fect", where rms underproduce for fear of being asked to do too much in the
future. Kalai and Ledyard (1988) showed that if the planner is su¢ ciently
patient, every SCR is dominant-strategy implementable. Burguet (1990/94)
showed that the revelation principle does not hold when outcomes are chosen in
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several periods. Candel (2004) proved a revelation principle in a model where a
public good is produced in two periods. Finally, Cabrales (1999) and Sandholm
(2007) studied implementation in an evolutionary setting. A related topic is
that of complexity, see Conitzer and Sandholm (2002). It seems likely that a
dynamic theory of incentives will bring new insights and will need new analytical
tools.
4. Robustness Under Incomplete Information. When designing a
mechanism, sometimes the planner does not know the structure of information.
In this case a mechanism must implement regardless the structure of informa-
tion, i.e. priors of agents, type spaces, etc. Corchón and Ortuño-Ortín (1995)
approached the problem by assuming that the economy is composed of "islands"
and that there is complete information inside each island. A mechanism robustly
implements a SCR if it does it in BE for every possible prior (compatible with
the island assumption) and in Uniform Nash Equilibrium. The latter requires
that an equilibrium strategy for an agent must be the best reply to what other
agents in the island play and to any possible message sent by agents outside the
island when they follow their equilibrium strategies (DAspremont and Gerard-
Varet [1979]). They showed that any SCR satisfying M and NVP is robustly
implementable (a later contribution by Yamato (1994) showed that Robust and
Nash Implementation coincide in this framework). The same concern has been
approached in a series of papers by Bergemann and Morris (see e.g. [2005])
where they ask SCR to be implemented whatever the playersbeliefs and higher
order beliefs about other playertypes. Artemov, Kunimoto and Serrano (2007)
require implementation for the payo¤ type space and the space of rst-order
beliefs about other agentspayo¤ types. They obtain very permissive results.
In a di¤erent vein, Koray (2005), has argued that, since priors are not con-
tractible, the regulator needs to be regulated in order to stop her from manip-
ulating the priors. He shows that the outcomes of this game vary over a wide
spectrum. Again the need of prior-free implementation is clear.
6 Answers to the Questions
1. Yes. We already saw in 4.3, Point 2, that "Bertrand-like" mechanisms im-
plement the Constrained Walrasian SCR in Nash and Strong equilibrium. But
this is not all: Schmeidler (1980) exploited the connection between price taking
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-which underlies Walrasian equilibrium- and "strategy taking", which underlies
Nash and Strong equilibrium and obtained double implementation by a mecha-
nism which does not resemble the market. Implementation of the Lindahl SCR
by an abstract mechanism was obtained by Walker (1981) building on previ-
ous papers by Groves and Ledyard and Hurwicz. Unfortunately, these positive
results turn negative when we consider Arrow-Debreu contingent commodities,
Chattopadhyay, Corchón and Naeve (2000) and Serrano and Vohra (2001).
2. A merger a¤ects social welfare in two ways: Positively, from cost savings
and negatively, from restricting competition. The rst e¤ect is uncertain and,
by now, I do not have to convince you that we should take with utmost caution
all announcements made by rms concerning cost savings. Corchón and Faulí-
Oller (2004) show that under a condition that is fullled in several standard
IO models, the SCR that maximize social surplus can be implemented by a
dominance solvable mechanism with budget balance.
3. There is a very simple mechanism which attains maximum surplus, Loeb
and Magath (1979). But in this mechanism the monopolist receives all the
surplus and the demand function must be known by the planner. These points
were worked out by subsequent contributions from Baron and Myerson, Lewis
and Sappington, Sibley and others.
4. By now the reader should know the di¢ culties of implementing e¢ cient
public decisions. When information is exclusive this is impossible, even though
an approximate e¢ cient decision can be obtained when the number of agents is
large. When information is complete, we have seen several examples of mecha-
nisms implementing e¢ cient outcomes.
5. There is no di¤erence between implementing market or fair outcomes.
Both have to pass the same tests, i.e. incentive compatibility, monotonicity
and simplicity/credibility of design. In exchange economies, Thomson (2005)
presents a simple and elegant mechanism that implements envy-free allocations
in Nash Equilibrium. In cooperative production, Corchón and Puy (2002) pre-
sented a family of mechanisms that implement in Nash Equilibrium any e¢ cient
SCR where the distribution of rewards is a continuous function of e¤orts.
6. Yes! An uninformed planner can set up a mechanism that yields e¢ cient
outcomes in circumstances where the market yields ine¢ cient allocations, i.e.
under externalities or public goods see Point 5 in 4.3 above. All we need is non-
exclusive information and that the SCR be Monotonic, the latter requirement
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can be skipped under renements of Nash Equilibrium.
7. Not completely. Suppose complete information among three or more
judges and that they all perceive the same quality of a given performance.
Clearly, truth is an equilibrium, because if all judges minus you tell the truth
you cannot change the outcome by saying something di¤erent. Unfortunately,
any unanimous announcement is also an equilibrium by the same reason. Thus
we are in a situation akin to T. 3. Fortunately, if preferences of judges fulll
certain restrictions, full implementation of the true ranking of ice skaters is
possible, because Monotonicity and No Veto Power hold so T. 7 applies, Amoros,
Corchón and Moreno (2002). If judges have di¤erential information, the truth
is no longer implementable as suggested by T. 2. See Gerardi, McLean and
Postlewaite (2005) for further insights and references on this problem.
8. ????? Do you think that we have all answers? This is just economics!!
Finally I will tell you why I like implementation theory so much. Firstly, the
implementation model solves the problems of the General Equilibrium model
mentioned in Section 2, namely: 1: It models a general economic system. 2: All
variables are endogenously determined by the interaction of agents. 3: Agents
incentives are carefully modeled and are taken fully into account. Secondly, the
theory is not based on assumptions like convexity or continuity/di¤erentiability
which, no matter how much we are used to them, are very stringent. By the
way, a beautiful paper by La¤ont and Maskin (referenced in their 1982 survey)
developed incentive compatibility in a di¤erentiable framework.
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